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Charity amidst plenty 
After decades of civil war and one-party rule, Angola has embarked on a double process of political 
and economic liberalisation. Since the watershed elections in 1992, multiparty politics and civil 
society organisations have been allowed, parliamentary elections were held in September 2008 and 
the main features of a market economy are in place.  
 Angola is very rich in oil, diamonds and other resources, and the country is currently 
experiencing two-digit economic growth (Isaksen et al. 2007:40). Angola’s oil production is more 
than 2 million barrels per day and the country is the biggest oil producer in Africa. The 
government’s revenue from the oil sector has increased fourfold between 2002 and 2006, from US$ 
7.5 bn to an estimated US$ 29.9 bn annually (EIU 2007:20). Despite the volatile oil prices, the 
government income will remain high.  
 At the same time, the majority of the population is still living in poverty after many years of 
civil war. Although exact figures are disputed, there is a widespread consensus that the vast 
majority may be defined as poor.1 One of the reasons for this is the illiberal character of the 
Angolan government: Angola has been classified as not free by Freedom House, highly corrupt by 
Transparency International, and badly governed by the World Bank.2 Income distribution is among 
the worst in the world, with a tiny oil-rich government elite and a large majority of war-worn people 
who earn their livelihoods from the informal sector.3  
 In this situation, traditional development aid is being cut back. Official bilateral and 
multilateral development aid (ODA) to Angola was about US$ 442 million in 2005,4 but this sum is 
decreasing in parallel to the government’s increasing oil revenues. From emergency relief, 
resettlement schemes and de-mining programmes, the remaining donors are mainly concentrating 
on good governance programmes.  
 However, in contrast to most of Africa, where official development assistance remains high 
and dominant and with some private funding added only through international NGOs, private aid to 
Angola is increasing. This charity aid is of a very particular nature: it is primarily provided by the 
international petroleum companies operating in the country, outside of government channels and 
outside of government control, and provided not only for charitable purposes. In addition, there are 
some private Angolan charities, but these are also mainly based on donations from national and 
international private sector companies and Angolan parastatals. International NGOs and foreign 
private aid is very small compared to the huge CSR (corporate social responsibility) contributions 
of the petroleum companies. 
                                                     
1 Although exact figures on poverty are disputed and the government claims a 12 percent drop in poverty rates over the 
past five years, there is a widespread consensus that the vast majority may be defined as poor. Analysts at the research 
centre CEIC at the Catholic University of Angola say two in three Angolans still live on $2 or less a day, the same 
percentage as in 2002. In a December 2006 poll by a pro-democracy group and the United States Agency for International 
Development, 6 in 10 Angolans said their economic situation was no better now than five years ago. UNDP reports that 
about 70 % of the population lives in poverty and 30 % in “extreme poverty”. Maternal mortality is particularly high and 
life expectancy is low at just over 40 years. UNDP also reports that Angola has the 17th worst Human Development Index 
ranking, which is far below its income rank (Isaksen et al. 2006; LaFraniere 2007; Transparency International 2006; 
UNDP 2006:286). 
2 Freedom House classifies Angola as not free (scoring 6 on political rights and 5 on civil liberties on its Map of Freedom 
2008, on a scale from 1 to 6, see www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2008&country=7340). 
Transparency International classifies Angola as highly corrupt (scoring 2.2 on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index on a scale from 10 to 1 where 1 is the most corrupt, and ranking 147 of 179 countries; see 
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007). The World Bank’s scores for Angola are very low on 
voice & accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/pdf/c4.pdf). 
3 Some data suggest that Angola is one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of income distribution and that 
the differences are increasing ( EIU 2007:13; Isaksen et al. 2006:6; UNDP 2005). 
4 OECD (2007): Aid Statistics, Recipient Aid Charts (by country) at: 
www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,3349,en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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 The companies’ social projects include projects that the companies are running directly, 
projects they are implementing through national and international NGOs and charity organisations, 
and programmes that are managed by the Angolan state oil company Sonangol. The financial 
contributions are made partly on a voluntary basis as a part of their CSR programmes and partly as 
an “expected” contractual obligation. 
 It is primarily the role of the government to supply public goods such as health, education 
and social services, and to deal with distribution issues. In some countries governments fail to do so, 
either because they lack capacity and institutions, or they do not prioritise the poor. Angola is a 
country where the government has largely failed to provide basic public goods for its citizens 
(Kolstad and Wiig 2007:10). In this vacuum, private companies are taking on some social 
responsibility, especially by spending on social projects in local communities.  
 This private provision of social services and public goods is largely made through channels 
outside of government agencies and outside of government control. Furthermore, this private 
provision of social services differs from government services in terms of its rationale.  
Social charity spending can be seen as an additional tax (and to some extent it is 
compulsory or perceived to be required; the government “expects” some social contributions, in 
particular under production contracts).5 However, social charity spending is rather a mechanism for 
branding and positioning. This is indeed important for the companies in a competitive setting and 
their altruistic credentials can therefore be questioned. 
 Regarding private Angolan foundations and charities, most of these have strong political 
connections and overtones. Some are run as private foundations by state companies (such as the 
Sonangol and Endiama foundations), and some have been established by high-ranking political 
figures. Most are serving political purposes, and therefore their altruistic credentials can also be 
questioned. 
 This study explores the types, the channels and the methods of charitable aid in Angola, and 
it investigates the amounts spent. Information on amounts and assessments of how private 
companies are contributing to social development in Angola is scattered and very limited. As such, 
it breaks new ground, as no previous assessments have been made.6  
 The paper also looks at the rationale for giving charitable aid to Angola and raises the 
question whether this charity spending adds to the problems of deinstitutionalisation, clientelism 
and lack of coordination of development efforts in the country. 
Private funds – the channels 
A variety of private charity aid is given to Angola in the form of donations and spending on social 
projects. These differ in terms of purposes, goals and priorities and in terms of institutional and 
organisational features; and they vary in terms of operating principles, management style, eligibility 
and selection criteria, as well as target and user groups. Some companies, for instance, are 
emphasising civil society as a democratising social force in their programmes (and organisations are 
supported and allowed to develop through the means of user groups, local community participation 
and sustainable organisational development), whereas other companies limit themselves strictly to 
quick and efficient but top-down social service delivery. 
 There is a significant difference between programmes and projects financed by private 
companies and public development programmes. This distinction is important because influence 
and control tend to follow the money; the contributors will normally have a final say in the 
                                                     
5 A certain percentage or share of signature bonuses (money paid up front for concessions) is assigned by law for social 
and development projects. Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) also regulate how much the oil companies will spend on 
social projects, as part of their oil production. This varies across blocks. 
6 We are aware of only one previous academic journal article on social funds in Angola, by Christine Messiant (1999), 
translated to English (2001). That article is, however, very limited in respect of facts and figures. At the same time, due to 
public and corporate policies of secrecy we have also had problems finding exact figures and other information on this 
topic; we therefore ask readers to consider our estimates with the utmost care. 
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distribution and management of the funds. Private companies will have the final decision-making 
power over their social contributions (within some limits set by government and implementing 
agencies, as noted later), whereas public funds will per se be subject to public control (which can be 
weak, though, as in the case of Angola where public information and control of government 
spending is very limited). 
 Another main difference is in the way the funds are managed and operated, as foreign 
organisations or as domestic organisations. Stakeholders are different in these cases. Foreign 
organisations will bring in considerations and opinions formulated abroad and in the international 
milieu, for instance stronger corporate social responsibility and pro-poor considerations, and tend to 
be more autonomous. Domestic organisations may be more subject to national political priorities 
and pressures. These two distinctions produce a typology of public or private funding on the one 
hand, and domestic or foreign organisation on the other.  
 The public and domestic type is financed from the state budget and managed by a public 
agency or office, and is usually named as a public investment programme, a social development 
programme, a credit or grant scheme, and the like. (This type of fund falls outside the scope of this 
study, which focuses on private funding). 
 The public and foreign type of fund is financed by (public) donor money.7 The most well-
known form is the World Bank-financed and -initiated Social Funds. Although the focus of this 
study is on private, corporate contributions, we have included this particular example because it can 
serve as a benchmark. It is rather autonomous (because it is foreign funded) and scores well on most 
of the success criteria, in particular on participatory decision-making, accountability and 
transparency, and on public-private partnerships. 
 The private and domestic type is the corporate social responsibility kind of fund financed 
by private, domestic companies and by private charity funds (charity organisations). 
 The private and foreign type is mainly the corporate social responsibility kind of fund 
financed by foreign companies. This contribution comes mainly from foreign companies operating 
in the extractive sector, and is either managed directly by the companies or channelled through a 
variety of organisations (including host government institutions and companies). The extent to 
which these contributions are voluntary may vary from pure company-controlled CSR projects to 
contracted contributions similar to tax payments. In addition, private and foreign contributions also 
come from non-profit organisations, charitable organisations, churches, foundations and NGOs. 
World Bank Social Funds – the model 
The most firmly established “social funds” are the funds initiated and mainly funded by the World 
Bank. According to the World Bank, social funds are “multi-sectoral programs that provide 
financing (usually grants) for small-scale public investments targeted at meeting the needs of the 
poor and vulnerable communities, and at contributing to social capital and development at the local 
level” (World Bank 2007). A similar depiction has been applied by other researchers (Batkin 
2001:430; Jørgensen and van Domelen 1999:6; World Bank 2002:xv).8 
 The “first generation” of World Bank-initiated Social Funds were launched in the mid-
1980s to serve as short-term safety nets to soften the impact on the poor of structural adjustment 
programmes. This was mainly achieved by providing temporary employment. The “second 
generation” Social Funds have adopted explicit institutional strategies aimed at empowerment, 
capacity building and sustainability goals, and they have adopted a longer-term focus.  
                                                     
7 Please note that sometimes a private social fund may receive some public funding and a public social fund may receive 
some private funding. FAS and FESA, for instance, receive some public Angolan money in addition to their foreign donor 
and private funding, respectively. 
8 Please note that the concept of “social funds” can be defined strictly as Social Funds of the World Bank type, of which 
there are now about 60 in the world, or less strictly as any non-governmental (private or foreign donor) arrangement or 
institution for the provision of social services and public goods. We apply the latter terminology, unless Social Fund(s) 
is/are written in capital letters. 
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 World Bank-type Social Funds have now been established in more than 60 countries 
throughout the world, for purposes ranging from post-emergency reconstruction to empowerment of 
local communities. They are financed primarily by the World Bank itself (through loans) but often 
with other donors also involved (through grants). World Bank support to social fund projects grew 
significantly through the 1990s, and was in 2004 financing almost US$ 4 billion in social fund–type 
projects. This financing was leveraged by an additional US$ 5 billion from other multilateral, 
bilateral and domestic resources (Bhatia 2005:1). 
  The World Bank’s Social Funds are usually established as distinct organisations, more or 
less independently organised within a central government agency, or within an NGO, a community-
based organisation or local government. With a strong focus on local communities, Social Funds 
serve a role in funding community projects, empowering communities and building linkages 
between communities and their local governments; and they have recently developed closer links to 
decentralisation processes.  
 Social Funds and social fund-type projects share three basic characteristics: they finance 
small-scale schemes and projects (typically social and economic infrastructure); they are proposed 
by local government or local organisations (which are also responsible for organising their 
implementation and often also contribute to the financing and future operation and maintenance); 
and they are specially created institutions, outside the established government structure of public 
administration (Batkin 2001:429). An important reason for this has been a desire to bypass existing 
institutions that are variously seen as incompetent, corrupt or otherwise ineffective. 
 From the literature on Social Funds we can see that they are generally effective means for 
reaching poor people, but in some cases they are not (Tendler 2000; World Bank 2002). It has, for 
instance, been argued that in order for Social Funds to operate efficiently, they need to operate 
autonomously from politicians and government bureaucrats, because social funds subjected to 
political interference may lead to waste, abuse and patronage (Batkin 2001:436). From Latin 
America, it has been claimed that “social funds can […] become politicized and be subject to 
clientelistic practices” (Penfold-Becerra 2006:3).9 
 The World Bank-initiated Social Funds are explicitly intended to differ from private charity 
by being demand-driven. The Social Funds model adds important elements of local ownership and 
community involvement in decision-making (World Bank 2000). The World Bank’s Social Funds 
are sometimes also quite innovative and have demonstrated new methods in terms of decentralised 
participatory decision-making, management and accountability, which can be adopted for broader 
application by public sector as well as private development organisations.  
 The importance of transparency and information campaigns has also been underlined for 
social funds (Carvalho and White 2004:144). By providing transparent information about the 
eligibility criteria, it is more likely that resources will be distributed in a way that benefits the target 
groups. However, social funds can, by allocating money outside of government channels and 
control, also disrupt the allocation of public resources and undercut the functions of local and 
central government (Tendler 2000). 
 The definition of social funds is invariant to the type of institution that makes the 
investment, whether it is private or public. Although the Social Funds are financed almost 
exclusively by public money (World Bank and other government donor money), these funds are 
relatively similar to private/corporate charity aid, and they can serve as a model against which 
private charities can be evaluated. 
 Having the specific Angolan context in mind, and inspired by the approach of Carvalho and 
White (2004) and of Tendler (2000), a number of theoretical assumptions and success criteria for 
                                                     
9 Furthermore, Penfold-Becerra claims that in Latin America, social funds “can and have been diverted by political 
interests. They helped either to ‘buy votes’ for reelection purposes, or to build political constituencies that strengthen 
support for different administrations throughout the region”, and that “during the 1990s the use of these types of social 
funds encouraged the rise of neo-populist leaders in the region“ (Penfold-Becerra 2006:3).  
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social projects emerge.10 The main criteria are transparency, accountability, institutionalisation and 
sustainability. We will explain why these criteria are important, and give some indications of how 
they might be operationalised. Finally, we will provide information about the different social funds 
in Angola and an assessment of their likely impacts.11 
 Transparency is one quality criterion for social funds. Managers of funds need to design 
and run efficient information campaigns on the new possibilities available to communities, so that 
people can take full advantage of them. Transparent management systems are also important to 
improve financial sustainability.  
 Information is a prerequisite for clarifying and prioritising across objectives. Objectives 
need to be clarified in order to target projects and areas (see for instance Batkin 2001:441). Lack of 
transparency regarding objectives makes it hard to select the right project in the right local area, and 
to evaluate the final outcome. A lack of information may prevent a user or client from holding the 
service provider accountable for (inadequate) service delivery, and may reinforce an asymmetric 
information and power structure. 
 More generally, transparency reduces corruption, improves coordination and improves 
social capital (Kolstad and Wiig 2008). Transparency is therefore vital for building community-
level trust. Cooperation and trust make it easier to provide local public goods at the community 
level and improve the efficiency of social fund projects. 
 Accountability is the second success criterion for social funds and social projects. 
Accountability is more than transparency; it involves checks and balances as well as control 
mechanisms. Project spending outside the oversight of established, elected control mechanisms 
(democratic oversight and control) is prone to abuse, for instance by serving the pecuniary purposes 
of managers. Funds can be channelled in a way that benefits the managers, politically or financially. 
The higher the level of discretionary power, the higher is the propensity for abuse, for instance in 
terms of corruption and embezzlement. 
 Oversight, checks and controls can and should therefore be exercised by the finance 
providers. A lack of interest, a transfer of decision-making authority to the project managers, and 
weak accounting and auditing can leave too much leverage in the hands of project managers, and 
lead to leakages and abuse. 
 Oversight, checks and controls can and should also be exercised by the end users, the 
intended target groups. When the end users (beneficiaries) have the information necessary and have 
the proper channels of influence (influence on project selection, management and follow-up), the 
level of ownership and sustainability of the project increases. 
 Institutionalisation is the third success criterion for social funds and social projects. 
Institutionalisation is about institutional learning (for instance, public institutions learning from the 
experience of social funds, and institutions learning by doing), and in terms of institution building.  
 The practice of channelling money through social funds and projects outside of government 
structures may add to the problem of deinstitutionalisation. The funds can impede the establishment 
and consolidation of government institutions, which in turn may lead to lower public expenditure on 
the poor. Government institutions for redistribution and service delivery are weakened when 
substantial funds are allocated and spent outside of government channels and there are no feedback 
or learning impacts between the two types of governance structure.  
 The problem of deinstitutionalisation is at its most severe when social funds and 
government expenditures are perfect substitutes (that social funds are perfectly crowding out public 
funding). In this case, increasing the use of social funds will decrease the pressure on traditional 
channels of public finance. The net outcome for the poor might not change if what social funds add 
to poverty reduction leads to a similar reduction in government spending. 
                                                     
10 Carvalho and White (2004) reviewed a large number of social funds and focused on sustainability and institutional 
development impact. Tendler (2000) puts a lot of emphasis on transparency and autonomy to secure efficiency. 
11 This is thus a process-oriented evaluation. A rigorous programme evaluation is outside the scope of this article due to 
lack of data. 
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 Besides, institutions for oversight and control, policy formulation, planning and coherence 
are weakened when kept at a distance from some of the more significant money flows in the 
country. Valuable planning and implementing skills might get lost for the line ministries and other 
government institutions.  
 Carvalho and White (2004:150-151) point to five factors that might reduce the problem of 
deinstitutionalisation: an explicit institutional development component, a demonstration effect of 
approaches, procedures or methods (to various government agencies), learning-by-doing effects, 
competition effects and demand effects (stimulating more demand for services from the 
communities).  
 We would also add the criteria of additivity and sustainability. Social funds should be 
provided in addition to government-provided funds, and there should be an initial agreement with 
central government ministries to provide adequate recurrent financing for social fund investments, 
because the government (central or local) will usually have to cover the cost of daily operations and 
maintenance after the initial investment is made. 
Private charities – the problem 
Private charities, and in particular the corporate donations by multinational petroleum companies 
and other extractive industries, have a problem because of the profit-maximisation motive and 
rationale of private businesses. For the oil companies, involvement in social projects might improve 
their reputation and thereby make it easier to win contracts.12 
 Oil companies are less efficient than traditional NGOs because their motivation for 
providing social funds is to obtain corporate objectives rather than altruism (Frynas 2005) and 
because it is more difficult to monitor their activities (Besley and Ghatak 2007). The corporate 
objectives are therefore not necessarily in accordance with the interests of society. There can be 
instances, however, in which oil companies are more efficient service providers than traditional 
charitable organisations, for instance when oil companies are dealing with problems created by oil 
extraction and when large-scale or specialised physical infrastructure inputs are needed.  
 At the same time, the private, corporate provision of social funds is also a response to the 
lack of transparency and accountability of the Angolan government. Private petroleum and diamond 
companies operating in the country are implementing social projects outside of government 
channels because of the low levels of public accountability.13 When public service delivery is of 
very low quality, the oil companies may feel they have the capacity and competence that the 
government is lacking. In the current situation, it makes sense for private companies to channel 
some of their tax money and voluntary contributions outside of the discredited state so as to 
maintain direct control of the use of the funds. 
                                                     
12 However, as shown in Wiig and Ramalho, other aspects of oil companies’ corporate social strategies play a more 
important role in winning contracts than their social activities, for instance the issues of local content and domestic labour 
(“Angolanisation”) (Wiig and Ramalho 2005:17). 
13 Note also that government donor agencies (which are currently pulling out of Angola due to the country’s strong growth 
rate) have never given any direct budget support to the Angolan government. Fiscal and budgetary processes have been 
too weak for that. 
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Social funds in Angola 
The various charities described above are all operating in Angola. There is one public and foreign 
fund, namely the World Bank-financed and -initiated Social Action Fund (FAS). Then, there are a 
number of private and domestic funds, financed by private Angolan companies and donations 
(sometimes also by public money). The most important ones are the social funds of the state oil 
company Sonangol, and the fund of the state diamond company Endiama, a fund called Brilhante. 
These two operate with (public) financing from the two state companies, but they are also financed 
by foreign partners and operators. Secondly, there are two domestic and private Angolan social 
funds, namely the two charities of the President and the First Lady, FESA (Fundação Eduardo dos 
Santos) and Lwini (Fundo de Solidariedade Social - Lwini).  
 The private and foreign funds in Angola are mainly financed by foreign companies in the 
extractive sectors (petroleum, diamonds). There are three streams of foreign private contributions 
from petroleum companies in Angola; these are moneys paid according to the signature bonus 
system or production sharing agreements (PSA), and projects financed by the companies as 
voluntary, post-tax contributions. In other words, the petroleum companies finance social projects 
in two different ways: the first and most important in terms of amounts is the payments made 
through the Angolan government-controlled petroleum company Sonangol (signature bonuses and 
some of the PSA money); and the second is money for social projects run directly by the companies 
either through their own charity organisations, such as the Shell Foundation and the Chevron 
CDPA, or through various charity organisations, churches, foundations and NGOs. 
 In Angola private and foreign charities also operate (private development organisations and 
international NGOs), such as Development Workshop (DW, Canada), Development Aid from People 
to People (DAPP, Denmark), Kirkens Nødhjelp (NCA, Norway), Norsk Folkehjelp (NPA, Norway), 
Care International, Open Society (USA), Oxfam (UK), Médecins sans Frontières (France) and 
ACORD. Some of these are to a small but increasing extent managing funds from private companies 
operating in Angola. 
 
Table 1: Typology of Social Funds in Angola 
 
FUNDING ORIGIN General Angola 
DOMESTIC (Govt programmes)  
PUBLIC  
FOREIGN  WB social funds  FAS 
DOMESTIC  
CSR funds  
 
 
Charity funds 
SONANGOL funds  
Brilhante 
 
FESA 
Lwini PRIVATE 
FOREIGN 
CSR funds  
 
Charity funds 
 
NGOs 
ExxonMobile Foundation 
Chevron CDPA  
 
 
DW, DAPP, NDA …  
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The Social Action Fund (FAS) 
In Angola, the World Bank-initiated Social Action Fund (Fundo de Apoio Social, FAS) was 
established in 1994 as an “organisation of public utility” and located within the Ministry of 
Planning. FAS I (programme period 1994-2000) was financed primarily by a World Bank credit, 
with an increase in donations from other donors through FAS II (2000-2003) and FAS III (2004-
2007). FAS III is financed by the World Bank (a loan of US$ 55 million) and the European Union 
(a grant of US$ 50 million), plus US$ 8 million from the Government and US$ 7 million from other 
(bilateral) donors (DFID, Norad and others). The government of Angola is a minority contributor, 
but its contributions to FAS are increasing. Annually, the FAS programme is approximately US$ 30 
million. FAS will be extended beyond 2007.14 
Sonangol and Endiama 
Of the (mainly) domestically financed social funds in Angola, we find first and foremost the two 
funds financed by the Angolan state and the parastatal companies Sonangol and Endiama.15 These 
companies contribute a relatively substantial sum of money for social projects through their own 
corporate social responsibility strategies, just like the foreign petroleum companies. 
 Sonangol is a public company, fully state-owned and with public regulatory functions, and 
at the same time a parallel, unconventional public finance system (Isaksen et al. 2007:viii, 18; 
Soares de Oliveira 2007:2). Sonangol said they were to concentrate their social funds in one 
corporate fund organisation, but was in 2007 still operating its social contributions on a production 
block basis. Sonangol also manages large parts of the social contributions of the other, private oil 
companies in Angola in its legal role as concessionaire of all oil blocks. Its mixed role as 
commercial enterprise, regulator, social contributor and implementer of social projects is 
problematic. 
 A main and increasing part of Sonangol’s social responsibility projects is infrastructure 
construction and training of staff. Besides, under the umbrella of CSR Sonangol funds are spent on 
projects in education, the arts, sports, science and the environment.16 Senior Sonangol staff 
indicated in interviews an aggregate sum of US$ 20 million per year, but it is unclear whether this 
included all production blocks and how much of this spending was directly on social projects.  
 The state diamond company Endiama has established a social fund to alleviate the social 
and environmental problems in its areas of operation – the fund Brilhante. As a quite new fund, 
established in 2004, its strategies, operations and impact are still unclear, but it seems that 
Brilhante’s main focus is on target groups within their own geographical areas (people affected by 
the mining industry).17 
 Brilhante runs projects directly, and it also “supervises” the projects run by other operators. 
Besides, Brilhante is also the “social and cultural face” of the diamond corporation,18 which means 
that its social component (or local community support) is smaller than the total spending of the 
                                                     
14 Information given by FAS, Luanda, interview April 2007. 
15 Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola (Sonangol E.P.) and Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola 
(ENDIAMA E.P). 
16 Sonangol expresses its social responsibility on its website in these terms: “Our commitment to sustainable development 
and the stability of Angola is the central premise of our philosophy. This commitment is visible in the annual budget set 
aside for investment in community projects. Sonangol Group works towards providing better conditions for the 
development of Angola by supporting projects in education, the arts, sports, science and the environment” 
17 Some of the problems caused by the exploitation of the diamond resources in the two Lunda provinces include that 
people are restricted from access to their cropland; that they are prohibited from using local rivers; and that damage is 
caused to soil and water systems. “The imposition of restricted and reserve zones subjects residents of the Lundas to 
arbitrary search and seizure by police and private security firms. Their homes and fields can be moved at the order of a 
diamond mining project” (Partnership Africa Canada 2007:19). 
18 According to the company website: www.endiama.co.ao/eng/emp.php?cat=fb 
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fund. Brilhante has an office in Luanda with a few employees and a technical assistance team of 6-7 
people. Its annual turnover is no more than US$ 5 million.19  
FESA and Lwini 
In addition to the state company funds, there are, as well as a few less important ones, two private 
Angolan funds of some size that act like charitable organisations: the President’s social fund FESA 
(Fundação Eduardo dos Santos) and the First Lady’s social fund (Fundo de Solidariedade Social - 
Lwini).20 Although these draw primarily upon private, local businesses for their funding, they also 
have some funding from private foreign sources (foreign companies operating in Angola) and some 
public Angolan funds (Messiant 1999:92). 
 The Fundação Eduardo dos Santos (FESA) is the President’s social foundation, a private 
charity initiated by President dos Santos back in 1966. According to its website, FESA aims to 
“contribute to ameliorate the suffering of disfavoured people”, in particular through providing 
“access to education and work”.21  
 Among the projects we find the construction of schools, dispensaries, houses, and 
infrastructural work, food aid and an annual “FESA week” (that coincides with the President’s 
birthday in August) with open seminars and lectures of a “technical-scientific” nature. Through its 
Community Development Programme FESA seeks to assist poor people through “housing, health, 
education, alphabetisation, agriculture, cooperatives and community advisors”. For the purpose of 
“national reconciliation”, FESA also supports a football team (“O Santos Futebol Clube”). 
 The contributions to FESA mainly come from the private sector in Angola. The larger 
foreign companies used to contribute to FESA, but now most contributions stem from minor foreign 
companies and Angolan companies. Despite some oil companies claiming that they no longer 
support FESA, and some even maintaining that this would be against their own corporate ethical 
guidelines and policies, a large number of foreign oil companies and multinationals are still listed as 
members of FESA’s General Assembly, which is an honorary body of FESA contributors and 
partners. 
 An estimation of the amounts channelled through FESA is difficult, but based on an 
estimate of an alleged US$ 100,000 contribution annually by each of the companies listed in the 
FESA General Assembly and some additional funds, we are probably talking about not more than 
US$ 15 million (unless the grand patron, “specially invited” businesses and “generous” public 
agencies are contributing in largesse). 
 The Fundo de Solidariedade Social – Lwini is a fund that was initiated by the First Lady 
Ana Paula dos Santos in 1998, after the visit by Princess Diana to Angola the year before. It is 
focused on supporting the victims of landmines in Angola, especially women and children. This is 
achieved through social projects (such as the distribution of wheelchairs and micro-credit for self-
help projects) and projects in health and education (such as orthopaedic rehabilitation, a library and 
adjustments to school buildings). 
                                                     
19 The figure is our guess only, as there is a complete lack of publicly available information on Brilhante and its projects. 
We were told at Brilhante headquarters about a sports stadium that was built at a cost of US$ 3 million, and US$ 1 million 
in support for the Dundo museum in Lunda Norte, and about ten four-room schools that were built in different villages, 
but not much more. According to the Canadian organisation “Partnership Africa Canada”, Brilhante has perhaps donated 
US$ 2 million for the refurbishing of Saurimo hospital in Lunda Norte, but “unfortunately that document – the annual 
report of a charitable foundation – is off limits to the public” (Partnership Africa Canada 2007:18). Besides, Brilhante 
“has taken a lead role in the refurbishment of the Iron Palace, an iron-frame heritage building in Luanda, designed by 
Gustave Eiffel. The Foundation’s plan calls for the refurbished palace, located across the street from Endiama’s 
headquarters, to be turned into a club for the use of diamond-sector executives“ (Partnership Africa Canada 2007:19). 
20 There are some quite small (defunct?) funds or foundations, on which we have no information, such as the Fundação 
Sagrada Esperança and the Fundação Quissama, which are both church-based funds. 
21 FESA website at www.fesa.og.ao (our translation). 
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 Lwini is organically linked to FESA, and among its honorary members are listed Cabinda 
Gulf Oil Company, Sonangol, De Beers, Endiama and Elf.22 The main contributors are, in other 
words, mainly Angolan corporations and private institutions. Links have also been forged with the 
Wheelchair Foundation in California, and projects are run in cooperation with, for instance, the 
national diamond company Endiama and the multinational oil company Chevron. Lwini is (like 
most social charities, including FESA) listed as a non-profit and “public utility organisation”, which 
gives it some privileges, such as import tax exemption and access to government credits and 
coverage of some of its running costs. One of the main activities of Lwini is fundraising, especially 
through the annual gala event. The annual budget is moderate, however, at between US$ 1 and 2 
million. 
CSR funds 
There are three streams of money from private petroleum companies that finance social projects in 
Angola within their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. These are moneys paid 
according to the signature bonus system, according to production sharing agreements (PSA), and 
projects financed by the companies as voluntary post-tax contributions.  
Social bonuses 
The first stream is the money paid by the commercial companies in the petroleum sector according 
to the signature bonus system. Signature bonuses are payments made when signing an exploration 
contract for a block, payments that usually (increasingly) include a “social bonus” component. The 
particular use of the funds is not specified by the bids; only a percentage or round sum is given for 
“social projects”. However, some operators have specified (or recommended) some areas of use, 
such as education and health. The signature bonuses now figure in the state budget, but the social 
bonuses do not. The social signature bonuses are managed by Sonangol.  
 The amounts both for signature bonuses and the component of social bonuses have 
increased considerably over the last few years, and the money arrives in tsunami-like waves 
following the bidding rounds. A peak was reached on the block 15, 16 and 17 agreements of late 
2006, when the consortium that won the bid offered around US$ 1 billion in signature bonuses and 
an additional US$ 200 million in social bonuses for each of the blocks (Isaksen et al. 2007:45).23 A 
new bidding round was carried out at the end of 2007 (of which we have no information yet on 
bonus levels). The social bonuses are in most cases paid upfront, while in some cases the sums are 
distributed over a number of years. If we distribute the funds over some years (5-10 years) and add 
the 2007 bonuses, a fair estimate is that the social bonuses on oil contracts are worth at least US$ 
100 million per year, a sum which is increasing. 
PSA social spending 
The second funding stream is social projects funded by the oil companies as a part of the production 
cost. Both private companies and Sonangol spend some amounts on social projects, depending on 
their production. This spending is partly specified in the PSAs, which make it a legal obligation. In 
addition to the PSA-specified contributions there is an additional “voluntary” contribution 
(sometimes requested by Sonangol, especially if oil production is good and prices high). This is 
over and above the PSA contribution, not specified in the PSAs but based on a “gentleman’s 
agreement”. 
                                                     
22 According to Lwini’s website at www.lwini.og.ao, which seems to be irregularly updated. 
23 The Italian company ENI and partners won the sealed bidding competition with a signature bonus of US$ 900 million, 
with an addition of US$ 50 million for social funds. The consortia that won the contracts for blocks 17 and 18 each paid 
signature bonuses of about US$ 1.1 billion and social funds of about US$ 200 million (Isaksen et al. 2007:45). 
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 About half of what is paid through the PSAs and their “voluntary” contributions is managed 
by Sonangol; the other half is managed by the companies themselves and run together with their 
voluntary post-tax contributions (see below). This funding stream is tax deductible. 
 Each block has a block fund for social projects that is financed by the operator and partners 
of the block (offshore or onshore), and about half the project funds are managed by the concession 
holder, which is by Angolan law always the state oil company Sonangol. There is one Sonangol 
block fund for each of the operating blocks (at least for the newer production blocks). This form of 
social fund is not unique to Angola, but the importance given to them by the oil companies and the 
total amount of funds given through the operator is significant for Angola.  
 The PSA-specified contributions to social projects have been put at close to US$ 100 
million per year for all oil blocks in Angola together (plus some additional “voluntary” 
contributions). Of this, around US$ 20 million is provided by Sonangol alone.24  
Voluntary contributions 
The third funding stream comprises post-tax voluntary contributions, which come in addition to the 
negotiated and contracted payments described above. The voluntary contributions comprise 
spending on various social projects by companies from their after-tax profits. The oil companies 
manage these on their own as a form of charity according to each company’s corporate social 
responsibility policy, and are mainly for visibility purposes and to build and/or protect their 
reputation.  
 The companies themselves implement both the (half) of the PSA contributions and the 
voluntary, post-tax contributions. These projects are run directly by some company managers 
(usually CSR officials) – with all the time-consuming detailed management that this requires – or 
through NGOs or church organisations selected as project implementers.  
 One of the NGOs implementing oil company CSR projects is the Danish organisation 
Development Aid from People to People (DAPP). DAPP is particularly interesting because of its 
links to the government. The organisation has its background in the Scandinavian left-wing 
solidarity movement of the 1970s, and has been operating various solidarity projects in Angola 
since the 1980s, although the number of “solidarity workers” has been declining and its 
professionalism increasing. Now it mainly manages a teachers’ college on behalf of the oil 
companies.  
 It seems that the companies treasure the government’s and ruling party’s ideological 
approval of the organisation (ideological history and belief in “African Socialism”) and the fact that 
DAPP is accepted and allowed to operate (and even appreciated) by the Angolan government.25 
Furthermore, DAPP’s background gives the organisation access to various government agencies 
and government funds (including FESA), which is also an advantage in terms of service delivery 
and efficiency. 
 In some cases, post-tax voluntary contributions are also run through company-controlled 
foundations such as the ExxonMobile Foundation (and its Africa Health Initiative, AIH) and the 
Chevron-initiated and -financed Centre for Development and Partnerships (Centro para o 
Desenvolvimento e Parceiras, CDPA).26 
                                                     
24 This rough estimate must be treated with care. The PSAs are never made public, the real figures are not published, and 
companies are very careful in providing estimates. Our estimations are based on figures suggested by Sonangol and 
private company representatives in interviews, but not verified by accounts. 
25 The relationship between the Angolan government and civil society organsations, and in particular foreign NGOs, has 
been very strenuous (Amundsen and Abreu 2006). 
26 CDPA is a consortium constituted from civil society organisations, NGOs, two state institutes and around 20 
individuals. The NGOs are SNV, DW, ADRA, MOSAIKO, Ibis, CEIC/UCAN, World Learning, Care International and 
FONGA; the state institutions are the institutes IDA (Institute for Agrarian Development) and INAP (National Institute of 
Public Administration). CDPA works primarily with capacity building and training of trainers at the provincial level, and 
aims to develop and deliver programmes and services to individuals, groups, organisations and institutions. The main 
services will be information management, studies and research, service and space for training and capacity building, and 
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 The post-tax voluntary contributions are modest in size as compared to the two other 
streams, but they are much more visible and are energetically promoted by the companies. For the 
operator Esso, the contribution is around US$ 5 million a year through the ExxonMobile 
Foundation. ChevronTexaco donates around US$ 10 million and StatoilHydro donates less than 
US$ 2 million annually for various projects and initiatives, BP donates around US$ 1 million per 
year and the smaller companies even less.  
 With more oil companies and a few larger diamond companies also contributing to social 
projects on a voluntary basis, we can make a very rough estimate of the social spending by the 
petroleum and diamond companies operating in Angola at around US$ 50 million per year. 
Total spending 
Are the social funds in Angola a substantial and important phenomenon, economically and 
politically, or are we talking about a peripheral and insignificant institutional arrangement? What is 
the size of the funds channelled though the social funds in Angola, as compared to the figures for 
other countries, as compared to the overall economy and to the social expenses of the Angolan 
state? 
 The numbers (estimates and “guesstimates”) from the above analysis give a sum of almost 
US$ 300 million annually for total spending on social projects by private companies in Angola 
through the three “streams” identified above. As a comparison, official bilateral and multilateral aid 
to Angola (ODA) was about US$ 442 million in 2005,27 of which the annual budget of FAS 
constitutes about US$ 30 million. This means that the flow of public money from external sources is 
about two times as high as the estimated annual contribution from the private extractive industries 
sector, but the share of public aid is decreasing.28 
 
Table 2: Average private company contributions for social projects 
 
 US$ per year (million)
Sonangol and Endiama 25
FESA and Lwini 15
Social bonuses 100
PSA social spending 100
Voluntary contributions 50
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the establishment of partnerships. Its potential clients and users are staff of civil society organisations, development 
professionals, multi- and bilateral donors, public institutions, universities, and small and medium private enterprises. 
27 OECD (2007): Aid Statistics, Recipient Aid Charts (by country) at: 
www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,3349,en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html  
28 The Angolan state budget for education amounted to about US$ 1,000 million in 2005, with an actual spend of US$ 765 
million. In 2007 the budget increased to US$ 1,755 million, according to the Ministry of Finance website at 
www.minfin.gv.ao  
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Social funds – an assessment 
Based on the typology and success criteria identified above, we will now make an assessment of the 
various fund types. First, we will present the Social Action Fund (FAS) as a model, because FAS 
scores relatively high on most of these success criteria. Then, the CSR funds (the contributions to 
social projects by the petroleum companies) are assessed in the same way. Finally we will take a 
look at the Angolan institutions: the state oil and diamond companies and the charitable 
organisations. 
The Social Action Fund 
As mentioned, the Social Action Fund (Fundo de Apoio Social, FAS) was established in 1994 as an 
implementing agency for the World Bank’s softer loans. FAS in Angola has evolved in a similar 
way to other social funds in the world, with more donors involved, a stronger organisation with 
more explicit and long-term strategies and a stronger focus on local community development, 
empowerment, and capacity building. FAS now covers all the country with social projects in all 
provinces and provincial teams in 12 of the 18 provinces. 
Transparency 
The Angola Social Action Fund scores very high on transparency. The fund has developed good 
practices in an information campaign targeted at user groups, with leaflets and information material 
also in local languages and a stream of local-level information meetings. A significant component 
of the organisation’s staff time is devoted to information for users on support possibilities and 
procedures. FAS seems to reach out very well to its user groups. 
 The strong emphasis on transparency can also be seen in the fact that FAS makes public its 
projects and programmes through newspaper and radio advertising, and larger construction 
contracts are allocated through an open and fair bidding process. Besides, local authorities are also 
duly informed and consulted about project plans. FAS runs a newsletter, and access to information, 
including information on finance and priorities from FAS head office, is no problem. 
Accountability 
Another criterion for success, namely accountability in decision-making, has been relatively well 
taken care of by FAS. In terms of user group influence on project selection, management and 
maintenance and running cost considerations, FAS ensures the engagement of local communities 
through a process of selection (sometimes election) of local steering committees (“núcleos 
comunitários” with about 5 members, with at least 2 women) and provincial steering committees 
(with 50-50 civil society organisation representatives and local government representatives).  
 FAS has the requirement that local groups also share the investments and running costs of 
the projects. Communities have to bear a share of the investment costs (10 – 20 %), if possible, and 
at least make public promises that some of the maintenance and running costs will be met by the 
beneficiaries, for instance through voluntary work. Besides, central and regional state institutions 
(education, health, social affairs, public works, etc., depending on the nature of the project) must 
submit a written guarantee that project maintenance and running costs will be covered in their 
annual budgets (basically the salaries for staff, teachers, health professionals, social assistants, and 
so on). 
 Local communities are thus efficiently brought into to the decision-making process as real 
partners. This secures the projects’ legitimacy and accountability and enhances their relevance and 
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efficiency. Local ownership seems to be secured; it is highly prioritised even when sometimes it is a 
long and strenuous process. 
 Furthermore, to the extent that social investments, for instance in school projects, 
necessitate financial contributions from local government (in particular the Provincial 
Administration where FAS operates), this is ensured through consultation in the planning process 
and written agreements prior to project implementation.  
 For the purpose of national planning, policy coherence and efficiency, FAS has aligned 
with the Ministry of Planning and various line ministries (in particular the Ministries of Health, 
Education and Public Works). In most cases, FAS is able to commit line ministries and regional 
authorities to taking responsibility for the maintenance and running costs of projects after their 
completion. This cooperation seems to be working well, at least insofar as there are few bottlenecks 
or overlaps in their efforts. FAS is also physically and organisationally situated within the Ministry 
of Planning, and the entire FAS programme seems to fit in with (or rather feed into) the national 
planning process. With about half the budget coming as a (soft) loan from the World Bank, the 
government has been duly committed to the programme.  
 Reporting, evaluations and financial accounting seem to be well taken care of. One question 
might be raised, however: to what extent do local communities and Angolan government 
institutions really influence the hard decisions? Despite having the World Bank and other major 
donors as financial contributors, with their agenda (in particular the social fund model of the World 
Bank), the institutional set-up of FAS nevertheless seems to be a well-functioning arrangement for 
securing a fair level of accountability. 
Institutionalisation and sustainability 
FAS consciously builds local competence and local institutions into its project implementation 
process. The projects’ local “núcleos comunitários” and provincial steering committees are core 
elements for local representation and competence enhancement, even when the committees are not 
always elected on a competitive basis (civil society organisations and central/provincial state 
institutions, for instance, nominate their representatives).  
 The connection between FAS project steering committees and the decentralisation process 
is more unclear. Although there is an element of organisational learning and capacity building in the 
local committees, and FAS projects are supportive of the emergence of local NGOs, neighbourhood 
committees and local interest organisations, there seems to be no deliberate strategy for linking this 
organisational capacity building into the ongoing (or rather coming) decentralisation process.29 The 
FAS projects and the local organisational activity and learning around these projects seem to have 
few links to the future establishment of elected local councils (communes). 
 In terms of organisational learning and institutional development at the central level, FAS is 
indeed contributing to skills and competence at the Ministry of Planning. At the same time, it has 
also been argued that FAS is a drain on the ministry’s capacity. However, given the relatively weak 
capacity of the Ministry, and its financial and political limitations, the establishment of a semi-
autonomous institution like FAS within the Ministry is nevertheless a good practical arrangement.  
 FAS has a strong focus on community-driven development, which means community 
groups of various sorts taking responsibility for prioritising and choosing the project/projects to be 
implemented, and also responsibility for providing labour and other inputs into every project. This 
safeguards the community ownership and long-term financial sustainability of the projects. 
 Furthermore, FAS has managed to move beyond exclusive financial dependency on the 
World Bank and through its strategy and competence has acquired funds from a wider range of 
donors in the form of grants. This increases FAS’s autonomy and demonstrates relatively good 
                                                     
29 Local elections have never been held in independent Angola, and future local elections are only at the planning stage, 
after parliamentary (2008) and presidential elections (2009). All local administrations are nominated by the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and by Provincial Governors. 
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financial diversity and sustainability. FAS’s strong local focus and its relatively autonomous 
organisational structure help safeguard it from political pressure. 
 The longer-term question, however, is whether or when the FAS office, with its priorities, 
skills and competence, can or should be fully incorporated into the Ministry. 
The oil companies 
Assessing how oil companies score on the four “success” criteria (described above) is a difficult 
task because a lot of information on their behaviour is kept secret. Part of the reason for this secrecy 
is the confidentiality requirements imposed by the government under PSA regulations, and the oil 
companies’ lack of will to violate them. Furthermore, some of the companies will not divulge their 
activities in any detail, not even their social programmes, because of the competitive market 
situation. Lack of information is indeed a key concern, which we will discuss further. 
Transparency 
The level of transparency varies among the stakeholders. The different block managers at Sonangol 
need to approve all expenditures in a block, including tax deductible social expenditure (part of the 
cost oil). Sonangol is therefore informed about what the petroleum companies are doing, but other 
stakeholders are not. There is no public information about what types of social activity the oil 
companies are financing under the different PSA arrangements. 
 Therefore, a number of questions can be raised. First, what are the objectives and targets of 
the social activities? Is the objective to reach the poor in the short run through financial support to 
education, health and safety nets or through long-term investments in capacity building and 
infrastructure? How far do the social projects extend? While social projects were used initially for 
financing traditional short-term charity purposes, we have seen an increasing trend towards putting 
more emphasis on long-term investment in training, capacity building and infrastructure. To the 
extent that the objective is to reach the poor, what groups of poor are targeted? Is it the poor in 
urban areas, in rural areas, in particular geographical areas such as Cabinda, or particularly 
vulnerable groups such as HIV/AIDS-infected persons? Secondly, what selection and evaluation 
criteria are applied? Although the oil companies have different objectives in their social activities, 
the public lacks a clear and transparent presentation of their objectives and their methodology for 
achieving these.  
 Both the oil companies and Sonangol take initiatives to create social projects, but there is a 
total lack of information about the criteria for this decision-making. Sonangol provides a list to the 
operator of potential projects and NGOs to support, and the operator presents its proposals. After a 
consultation with (and sometimes preferences expressed by) the licence partners, the block manager 
decides which projects to support. Then formal approval is given by Sonangol’s Board of Directors. 
We have no indicators that this selection process reflects any conscious development strategy. 
 Our conclusion is that the lack of clear and prioritised objectives and selection criteria leads 
to inefficient and incoherent projects. Internal ex post evaluations of projects by Sonangol might 
mitigate this, but any evaluation reports are not publicly available. We know that transparency 
normally improves efficiency, but why is this information opaque? 
 We have already pointed to the fact that the PSA agreements are confidential. However, it is 
easier to get information about what the oil companies are doing on other CSR-related issues, such 
as local content and training, than on their social activities. Part of the reason is probably related to 
the motivations and incentives for the companies’ CSR policies.  
 Efficiency concerns might not be so important for activities that do not pay off. In a study 
of oil companies’ CSR policies from 2005, oil companies and petroleum service companies 
operating in Angola said they had a CSR policy, and that the main ingredients were training of local 
staff (“Angolanisation”) and the use of local resources (Wiig and Ramalho 2005). Companies 
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generally pointed to their code of conduct and the requirement from the government as the main 
incentives for being socially responsible.  
 As regards the code of conduct, most companies did not feel any more responsibility in 
Angola as compared to other countries. For the government, the issues of local content and 
Angolanisation were the most important issues and what companies did on these issues might have 
an impact on the licence to operate: being responsible in this arena could pay off. It was noticeable 
that oil companies accordingly spent more of their CSR funds on economic issues, like local content 
and Angolanisation, than on social issues, which were not paying off (Wiig and Ramalho 2005:17-
18).  
 Information about how the oil companies are dealing with local content, labour issues and 
environmental issues are accordingly easier to acquire than about their social activities. If the target 
of social activities is to increase and improve the private provision of public goods, a more 
transparent clarification of objectives and transparent selection of projects are needed. More 
generally, the motivations and driving forces of oil companies’ (and Sonangol’s) corporate social 
responsibility are therefore of vital importance for more efficient service delivery. Some civil 
society institutions are, for instance, so sceptical about the oil companies’ social agenda that they 
refuse to solicit their funding support. 
 Voluntary contributions are visible. Most established oil companies in Angola provide 
around US$ 1 million or more per year to various social purposes. Although information is more 
transparent, apart from some of the largest oil companies in Angola most companies lack strategic 
criteria for their support. Few if any of the companies coordinate their activities.  
  Out of the three largest oil producers in Angola, only the American oil companies Chevron 
(ChevronTexaco) and Esso (ExxonMobile) have a pamphlet presenting their social missions and 
activities in Angola. Esso provides a corporate citizenship report on Angola and claims to spend 
more than US$ 14 million on CSR activities (including social activities under the PSA). Esso 
prioritises support to the education sector. Esso has during recent years built up a CSR department 
comprising a team of three persons and claims to have a quality-based system for selecting and 
implementing projects. 
 The French company Total (previously TotalFinaElf) has a worldwide CSR report that 
includes information from Angola, but it is difficult from this report to reveal what types of activity 
are financed by its after-tax contribution and what part is financed under the PSA agreements. Total 
focuses on health issues in its CSR policy and is contributing US$ 1.16 million to a health 
vaccination programme.30  
 In addition to the majors described above, the oil company Saipem (of the Italian ENI 
S.p.A. group) has published a CSR report on its activities in Angola, StatoilHydro has a 
“Government Relations and CSR” pamphlet on Angola, and some of the other smaller companies 
similar reports, but information on strategies and amounts is not clear. 
 Chevron has also created a CSR department at its offices in Luanda, which represents an 
interesting case by linking its activities to civil society organisations and donor agencies. Chevron is 
very clear about applying a strategic framework for prioritising across sectors and involving 
stakeholder groups. This strategy partly reflects the fact that Chevron has been involved in Angola 
for a long period (it might be time for payback) and that it is part of consortia that produce around 
one third of the oil production in Angola. Being a large producer, Chevron might feel that it needs 
to take on a larger responsibility.  
 Chevron has also faced the costs of being punished by the government after its oil leakage 
some years ago (where they received a large fine). The civil unrest in Cabinda poses a threat to its 
stake in Cabinda to the extent that a new Niger Delta Syndrome might arise.  
 Nevertheless, Chevron, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), in cooperation with the Government of Angola, in November 
2002 signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the formation of two public-private 
                                                     
30 www.total.com/static/en/medias/topic1606/Total_2006_CSR_en.pdf  
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partnerships. The Angolan Partnership Initiative (API) expands Chevron’s traditional community 
support by working on broader development assistance outside Cabinda and is establishing strong 
project partnerships with NGOs. The partnership, in its second phase in 2006, has each partner 
contributing an additional US$ 5 million (or US$ 1 million per year) to projects aimed at building 
the capacity of municipal governments and promoting the development of commodity value chains. 
Nearly half the money is channelled to the Centre for Development and Partnerships (Centro para 
o Desenvolvimento e Parcerias de Angola). The MoU has also established the Angola Enterprise 
Program with the UNDP, to which Chevron committed US$ 3 million and the UNDP US$ 1 
million. This programme promotes small- and medium-sized enterprise development in Angola.  
 The support of civil society organisations and the private sector is an important way of 
reducing potential resource curse problems, but at the same time one might claim that the poor are 
not being reached – at least not in the short run.  
Accountability 
Similar to transparency, the accountability of the oil companies varies across the different 
stakeholders involved. Oil companies are accountable to Sonangol in respect of their activities 
covered under the PSA agreement. Their activities under PSA are approved by Sonangol and 
audited, but the audited reports are not available to the public. More generally, oil companies are 
probably more accountable to the government than to civil society. While the government has a 
clear influence through its right not to approve social projects or to refuse the companies a licence 
to operate, the poor lack voicing mechanisms. Even investors lack voicing channels as information 
is sparse. 
 Esso and Chevron, for instance, claim that their activities are in concert with and 
coordinated with line ministries. But oil companies are accountable neither to the potential end user 
nor to the owners or investors. User and target groups cannot complain to oil companies that they 
did not receive the needed and promised support, while investors might find it difficult to expose 
what social activities the oil companies have been pursuing and therefore be unable to impose 
sanctions if these activities are not in line with the preferences of the owners.  
 Lack of information also reduces accountability to the media and civil society. The media, 
both nationally and internationally has an important role to play,31 but access to information is 
pivotal. The role of civil society is also enhanced when access to information is good (Amundsen 
and Abreu 2006). 
 We are not aware of any information campaign undertaken by the oil companies in order to 
create discussion groups among or communication channels with end users. Oil companies claim 
that the needs are so huge that needs assessments are unnecessary. Accordingly, we have seen few 
examples of needs assessments.  
Institutionalisation and sustainability 
Lack of information also reduces trust and social capital in the local communities, which in turn 
impedes institutional development at all levels of a society from the local to the central level and 
across all types of institution (private or public). 
 Social projects undertaken by the oil companies need to bridge to other local social projects 
undertaken by the private or public sectors. Without explicitly including learning and training 
elements, existing institutions might not learn from the social projects financed by the oil 
companies. Lack of external evaluation of CSR projects impedes institutional learning.  
 Institution building requires managerial skill and competence; it is costly and takes time. 
There are few observable measures of success in the short run. For a service-providing NGO 
                                                     
31 See, for instance, the role of the international NGO Global Witness and the international media in kick-starting the EITI 
process, in Shaxson (2007:chapter 11). 
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working on projects funded by oil companies, institution building will increase its overhead costs. 
There is therefore a trade-off between institution building and efficient service delivery in the short 
run.  
 Most of the oil companies interviewed were biased in this trade-off. They preferred 
supporting service providers with low overhead costs, indicating that institution building is not a 
prioritised area. 
 Lack of coordination also impedes learning. Oil companies cooperate on environmental 
issues (such as the flaring of gas) but not on improving the efficiency of social projects. There is no 
coordination and information sharing across blocks on social projects, indicating that the companies 
are not concerned about institutional learning.  
 Oil companies are profit-motivated institutions – not development institutions. Company 
personnel have technological knowledge but lack development competence. They should therefore 
be humble in dealing with social projects and be open to learning from institutions that have this 
experience. Instead, each company follows its own perception of what is a good social project. We 
noted, for instance, that one of the major oil companies claimed that it did not bother about others’ 
social activities, highlighting the problem of coordination and a lack of benchmarking experiences.  
 In some smaller companies there is no local CSR department, and personnel dealing with 
these issues are constantly changing. Their CSR strategies and social spending priorities are 
therefore very dependent on the person(s) bearing the responsibility at a given moment. Besides, the 
companies’ CSR policies provide few operating guiding principles for their social activities apart 
from general objectives. The internal incentive structure does not facilitate efficient social projects. 
Salaries are, for instance, not related to CSR performance. 
Angolan parastatals and charities 
The Angolan parastatals’ social funds and the Angolan charity funds share many of the 
characteristics of the foreign petroleum companies on the success criteria (which will not be 
repeated), but they also display certain important specifics. Being part of the government structure 
(which must be a fair characterisation of these fully state-owned Angolan businesses), Sonangol and 
Endiama are no more transparent or accountable than the Government of Angola.32 The Angolan 
charity funds that are initiated (and directed?) by top-level political figures run an even greater risk 
of being used for pecuniary, political and patronage purposes.  
Sonangol and Endiama/Brilhante 
The two Angolan state companies in the extractive sector, Sonangol and Endiama, are also 
important contributors to social projects, although not on the same scale as the foreign oil 
companies. Sonangol operates its social programmes basically on a block-by-block basis, with each 
block director as manager and projects approved by the Sonangol board of directors and the block 
operator on behalf of partners. Endiama has institutionalised its social projects in a foundation, the 
Fundação Brilhante fund, in which “all companies of the diamond sector can take part”.33  
 According to Soares de Oliveira, Sonangol is on the one hand “at the service of the 
presidency and its rentier ambitions” and “a basic tool for elite empowerment”, and on the other 
hand “from the very start protected from the dominant (both predatory and centrally planned) logic 
of Angola’s political economy” and therefore “an island of competence thriving in tandem with the 
implosion of most other Angolan state institutions” (Soares de Oliveira 2007:1). 
                                                     
32 According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for the year 2007, Angola scores very low on the 
“voice and accountability” percentile with 12 (on a scale from 0, world’s worst country to 100, the best), and the rating 
has been falling since 2003. “Regulatory quality” is at the same low level but slowly increasing 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/). 
33 According to the Endiama website at www.endiama.co.ao/eng/emp.php?cat=fb  
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  This sounds like a contradiction, but it is not. The Sonangol Group, with other national oil 
companies, controls an increasing share of the world’s oil resources, and is a sophisticated company 
employing thousands of people and active in four continents. Sonangol is an institution of real 
efficiency amid the chaos of Angola’s economy and the shakiness of other state institutions 
(Shaxson 2007:177). At the same time, “its tools and professional expertise […] are put at the 
service not of broad-based prosperity but the enrichment of the few” (Soares de Oliveira 2007:21). 
 Despite its professionalism, or rather because of its political purpose, the level of 
transparency of Sonangol’s social programmes is quite low. Even though most Western banks and 
oil companies speak very well of Sonangol and report hassle-free interactions with the company 
(Soares de Oliveira 2007:11), information on Sonangol’s social projects is less accessible.  
 Information on the Sonangol-managed social bonuses is not available from any open 
sources, the Sonangol-managed PSA funds for social projects are made inaccessible by the same 
confidentiality clause that restricts the private companies from divulging information, and no 
aggregate information on Sonangol’s voluntary (post-tax) projects is available (only information on 
specific projects through the website and Sonangol’s brochures and reviews).  
 The international campaigns EITI and PWYP have been pushing for openness also in the 
Angolan case, but with very little success. Angola has not signed the EITI principles (Isaksen et al. 
2007:45) and the PWYP campaign has accomplished next to nothing in Angola.34 When BP 
promised to publish its payments to Angola in 2001, “the Angolans reacted with fury. Their riposte 
came from the state oil company Sonangol, which threatened – in a letter copied to the other oil 
companies in case they missed the point – to terminate BP’s contract in Angola” (Shaxson 
2007:216). 
 The information available on the Brilhante foundation and its social activities is even 
scarcer, mainly due to the remoteness of the diamond extraction areas and the political sensitivity of 
the operations (some concessions based on agreements between the MPLA government and former 
UNITA guerrilla “generals”, international concern about “blood diamonds”, etc.). It nevertheless 
seems to be the case that Brilhante has taken on some concern for the populations in the diamond-
affected areas, at least according to its CRS policies. 
 One of the main problems with the Sonangol social projects, in addition to the fact that 
some of what are labelled “social projects” can hardly be understood as such, is that they are 
managed on a block-by-block basis (separately) by the block directors. The final approval of the 
projects lies with the Sonangol Board of Directors and in negotiations between Sonangol (as the 
concessionaire) and the operators (acting on behalf of the block partners). This institutional 
arrangement leads to a number of problems. 
 For one thing, there is a coordination problem. Block directors (and their staff) and 
operators differ in their focus of social projects: some are more concerned than others about deeper 
development problems, poverty issues, concerns for directly affected populations, and national 
content such as staff training, competence building and local inputs. Besides, although the operators 
are not strong in their influence on Sonangol and its project selection and management, the different 
operators also (at least sometimes) push their preferences on social projects.35 Any overall 
development strategy is lost to these differing priorities and differing operational and efficiency 
concerns.  
 Secondly, the vagueness of criteria for project selection (without prior needs assessments, 
for instance), the opaqueness of the decision-making process and the high levels of discretionary 
powers raises concerns about misuse and politicisation. Although we have no information about 
actual misuse of funds (corruption, embezzlement) or abuse of power (projects serving the 
clientelist, favouritist and pecuniary interests of managers), the low levels of transparency and the 
high levels of discretionary power in the hands of block directors may lead to such problems. 
                                                     
34 For a good account of these two initiatives, see Shaxson (2007:chapter 11), and for background and updates see the 
websites of EITI (http://eittransparency.org) and PWYP (www.publishwhatyoupay.org). 
35 Some are, for instance, more interested in education projects or projects in particular geographical areas. 
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Finance audits and the occasional on-the-spot evaluation of projects by operators cannot guarantee 
that pecuniary, political or patronage interests have not influenced the selection of projects, project 
sites, beneficiary groups or entrepreneurs. 
 Thirdly, the block-by-block management of social projects leads to a very weak 
institutionalisation of social concerns in the Sonangol system. Knowledge of development issues, 
project management, coordination and competence building is split between several offices of the 
organisation. The capacity of Sonangol is also thinly stretched and the final decision-makers (the 
block managers) have a technical background. In many cases it takes more than a year for oil 
companies to get final approval from Sonangol to undertake a social project. 
 In accordance with the significant increase in oil production in Angola, the working 
pressure on Sonangol’s staff is rising, including growing funds for social projects. At the same time 
they have tried to play a more active role in selecting social projects. According to the oil 
companies, Sonangol has even demanded additional social funding from the oil companies. All in 
all, Sonangol is faced with an increasing capacity problem in dealing with social projects. 
 There are now plans for uniting the social projects in one larger unit (foundation?) of the 
Sonangol Corporation, but until this process has come to a conclusion, the project administration 
will remain scattered.36  
 Fourthly, the sustainability question looms large in the Sonangol-managed projects. 
Sonangol has been characterised as a ‘state within the state’, for instance because of its parallel 
finance system (Isaksen et al. 2007:viii, 24), and despite claims that the lists of projects are 
coordinated with line ministries Sonangol is also taking over social functions from the ministries.  
 Besides, the Sonangol focus on needs assessments, user group information and community-
driven development is very weak. The need to display the Sonangol logo on “positive” projects and 
activities,37 plus its customary top-down management style, makes its projects weak on local 
ownership.  
FESA and Lwini 
The President’s social fund FESA (Fundação Eduardo dos Santos) has been said to be 
“contributing to a personality cult” and characterised as an element of a “system of clientelist 
domination” and an element of the “privatization of the Angolan state” by the political elite 
(Messiant 2001:288, 296). The objective of the foundation is quite clear: it is to make charitable 
donations “to celebrate the birthday of its patron”.38 
 During the “FESA Week” each August there is a great deal of publicity, birthday greetings 
and “happenings”, but the general level of project information and transparency in FESA’s 
operations is very weak. Some contributors and partners of the foundation are said to have access to 
project and financial information, but this is not accessible to the broader public. With this lack of 
transparency in mind, and given the stated objectives of the foundation, the structural factors are in 
place to generate suspicion that the foundation mainly serves a political purpose.39 The political 
purpose of Lwini (the First Lady’s Fundo de Solidariedade Social - Lwini) is less obvious and 
perhaps negligible.  
                                                     
36 Whether the plans for a “Sonangol Social Foundation” are good will basically depend on whether it will incorporate 
strong and structured regulations for transparency into its operations and accountability to its users as well as its 
contributors (the other oil companies). 
37 “The company certainly makes strenuous efforts at peddling its ‘modern’ image, as can be gauged from its many glossy 
publications, carefully manicured road-shows, lavish expenditure on lobbyists in western capitals, and soundbite 
references to corporate social responsibility and other business-speak” (Soares de Oliveira 2007:12-13). 
38 Objective made explicit by FESA itself, cited in Messiant (2001:297). 
39 We have learned that the specific links between the foundation and the President of the Republic have led to one 
petroleum company refusing to contribute to FESA, as it would entail a breach of its “code of conduct”. Furthermore, the 
issue of the Norwegian oil company Hydro’s annual contribution of US$ 100,000 to FESA has been debated publicly in 
Norway  (see for instance Morgenbladet, 17 Oct 2008). 
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Concluding notes 
We have seen that social funds are extensive in Angola. In contrast to many other poor countries 
with social funds, these funds are financed basically by the private, extractive sector. While donor 
funding is decreasing, this private funding of public goods is increasing in Angola. Along with the 
rising oil production, oil companies in particularly will increase their social spending. In the near 
future, private funding will probably be higher than foreign (public) aid. 
 In light of the important role that social funds play in Angola, we have asked if it is likely 
that these funds can succeed. Are the social funds a way of addressing the needs of the poor, and are 
they a pertinent institutional arrangement for delivering social services and public goods?  
 Our overall conclusion is that the private, corporate social funds score quite low on the 
success criteria, and therefore we regard the funds as not a smart or efficient way of providing 
social services and public goods. 
 The main exception is FAS, which scores, as we have seen, quite high on transparency, 
accountability and sustainability. With its emphasis on community-driven development, FAS 
enables local communities to take responsibility and thus FAS ensures the relevance and 
sustainability of the projects. 
 The main weakness of the social spending of the two Angolan state companies Sonangol 
and Endiama is that they are no more transparent and accountable than the Government of Angola. 
They are sub-institutions of a state apparatus which is at the service of the presidency and the ruling 
elite, for elite empowerment and predation. The social projects of the two institutions are most 
probably serving a political purpose and subject to clientelistic practices. 
 For the petroleum companies, this is a major problem for their CSR credibility, as they are 
funding projects managed by these structures. Furthermore, the main weakness of the oil 
companies’ social activities in Angola is the lack of transparency in terms of what their motivations, 
objectives, contributions and concrete activities are. Information about oil companies’ social 
activities is quite opaque, and it is therefore difficult to monitor what the oil companies are doing 
(for the government, the user groups, the public in general and for international observers). Also in 
terms of accountability, institution building and sustainability, there are alternative ways of 
providing public goods that are more efficient. 
 Petroleum companies have, however, some strategic advantages. They are large and 
sometimes powerful negotiators, with a technological and political capability that may alleviate 
some of the political and administrative bottlenecks of the public sector, and may deliver services 
fast and efficiently. They may reduce the impact of weak governance, a lack of political will, 
clientelism and the “resource curse”, including the “crowding out” of the small/medium-sized 
Angolan enterprise sector which is a part of this curse. 
 However, the oil companies are reluctant to undertake these activities. The motives for their 
CSR engagement are limiting their development impact and they are failing to integrate CSR into a 
larger development plan.  
 We have seen from this analysis a number of implications of the privatisation of aid to 
Angola through the various social funds and other financing mechanisms of social projects 
described above, implications that are rather similar to other resourced-cursed countries.  
 First of all, there is a lack of transparency and openness in the petroleum sector. The 
efficiency and accountability of social projects (and consequently also the legitimacy of the oil 
companies and their CSR) depend on transparency in operations and in financial transactions. 
Globally, the companies can do much more in terms of adhering to the EITI principles, and a good 
way to start is by being open and informative about the goals, strategies, funds and projects in the 
CSR arena, and in particular the social projects. The openness (and visibility) concerns taken up by 
the companies in respect of their voluntary post-tax spending could and should be replicated first 
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with the PSA “voluntary” spending and then with the PSA compulsory spending, without meeting 
much difficulty or resistance. 
 Secondly, stakeholders and user groups of social projects are not sufficiently included in the 
selection, decision-making and management processes. In this respect, the oil companies could 
learn a great deal from the FAS model, and from some professional development agencies and 
Angolan NGOs. Observers (from the media, civil society organisations, churches, line ministries 
and provincial administrations) could also be invited to ensure transparency, accountability and 
responsibility.  
 Furthermore, needs assessments, local participation and learning processes are not taken 
sufficiently seriously to ensure a sustainable institution building and learning process. Projects on 
the ground could empower people through learning and institution building if people were 
systematically included in decision-making and implementation of social projects. Local steering 
committees and projects that link up to the coming decentralisation process would be empowering. 
 Thirdly, there is an almost complete lack of coordination of projects and programmes.40 The 
petroleum companies barely cooperate on priorities, benchmarks and bottom lines, either between 
themselves or with the NGO sector or government ministries and local authorities. A 
synchronisation of the social projects in an independent coordinating unit could, for instance, be a 
promising avenue for improving coordination of the use of social funds. Such a unit should be 
autonomous, professional and efficient, and could also deal efficiently with the issues of 
maintenance and recurrent costs, both of which are important for the sustainability of any social 
project.  
 Fourthly, some weaknesses are caused by the continuing emphasis on projects rather than 
programmes. The major public donors changed from project to programme support years ago, partly 
because a programme-oriented funding structure makes it easier to deal with institutional learning 
and to improve the sustainability of the projects. Besides, large programmes may facilitate 
institution building better than small projects.  
 Finally, most of the social funds, and in particular the petroleum companies, have a weak 
overall development strategy and unclear objectives. The company CRS strategies are vague on 
development priorities, the social projects are mainly managed by technicians, and concerns other 
than the development of Angola are blurring their vision. Thus, the total sums up to charity, alms 
and positioning, without any link to the “resource curse” caused by the resource extraction in the 
first place and the ensuing political economy needs of the country. 
 
                                                     
40 This research was partly triggered by a story we heard about the three schools that had been constructed very close to 
each other in Cabinda province, by three different souces of funding, whereas neighbouring communities had none. Using 
the same construction company probably added to efficient building construction (and the schools figures look good in the 
glossy company annual CSR reports and on company websites), but without proper community involvement and 
provision for running cost, only one of these was actually functioning. 
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